Political Leaders in Westminster Systems
There is little doubt that political leaders have become more politically important over the past half century, although the extent which their electoral influence may have increased remains a matter of debate. This fundamental change in the role of political leaders has been especially pronounced in parliamentary systems based on the Westminster model. In parliamentary systems, the promotion of leader images during national election campaigns is now as prominent-perhaps even more prominent-than party symbols, leading some to argue that the Westminster system is converging with its presidential counterpart (Mughan, 2000) . In parallel with this change, governments and sometimes even oppositions are routinely labeled after the leader by the media and by the public, rather than after the party they lead (McAllister, 1996) .
The defining moment in this change is often traced to Margaret Thatcher's accession to office in Britain as the first 'conviction politician' of the postwar years. However, it is often forgotten that Pierre Trudeau's election as Canadian prime minister in 1968 led to the 'Trudeaumania' phenomenon which is perhaps the earliest manifestation of a prime minister's popularity surpassing that of his or her party. Since the 1990s, it has become more commonplace for governments or parties to be named after their leader. In Germany, the popularity of Helmut Kohl and more recently Gerhard Schroder has at various times easily eclipsed the parties they lead, as has the popularity of Silvio Berlusconi in Italy and Tony Blair in Britain.
The changing role of prime ministers has not only occurred in terms of their public profile within the electorate. In the context of their capacity to influence policy, postwar prime ministers in Westminster systems have accumulated considerably greater power and authority when compared to their prewar counterparts (King, 1994; Rhodes, 1995) . In many Westminster systems, it is often argued that cabinet government based on collective responsibility has been undermined, in part by the increased complexity of modern decisionmaking, but also by a conscious effort to centralize prime ministerial authority.
Moreover, in majoritarian systems such as that of Australia and Britain, the prime minister now exercises unprecedented power in shaping ministerial careers, a crucial tool in ensuring compliance and centralizing authority.
The prima facie evidence suggests, then, that prime ministers and opposition leaders have replaced many of the roles historically played by political parties in ensuring the efficient operation of the parliamentary system. This chapter examines the evidence to support this observation in Australia, Britain and Canada, focusing especially on the presidentialization hypothesis. However, a major task of the chapter is also to outline some of the factors which have led to a greater focus on prime ministers, and in this, these are divided between exogenous factors, such as the changing role of television, and institutional changes, such as the increasing complexity of public policy.
Australia, Britain and Canada are particularly appropriate case studies. Although all three operate political systems which have a common origin in the Westminster model, they vary considerably in how that model has evolved to cope with their differing circumstances. Both Australia and Canada adopted federal systems, although there the similarity ends. In Australia, the power of the majority party is tempered by the influence of the upper house, the Senate.
Originally conceived of as the 'state's house'-a house of review in which the states' aims would balance those of the parties-in recent years the control of the Senate by the opposition parties has effectively meant that the government must either drop or radically alter its more controversial legislation if it wishes to see it implemented (Sharman, 1999) . 1 In neither Britain nor Canada is their such an institutional impediment to majority rule. In Britain the governing party can count on implementing its legislative program. The House of Lords represents no major impediment to the government putting its policies into law, and in the rare occasions when its lower house majority has been so small as to place its legislative program in jeopardy, an election has been called. 2 In Canada the federal government is effectively independent of the provinces in the areas in which it has jurisdiction; when negotiation takes place, it is generally in the areas of provincial jurisdiction when the provinces are seeking federal financial support. In both Australia and Canada, then, prime ministerial authority must take account of federalism in realizing their policy goals, and in the former, this means the constraint placed on such authority by the upper house. No conflict between the legislature and the executive. Perhaps the most distinctive difference between parliamentary and presidential systems is while the executive is elected by and responsible to the electorate in a presidential system, in a parliamentary system the executive is formed from, and depends for its continuing survival upon, the legislature.
Parliamentary Systems and Political Leaders
3 In parliamentary systems, by contrast, the executive depends for its survival on the confidence of the legislature. Indeed, in most cases the prime minister is selected by the legislature, although in practice this will normally be the leader of the majority party or, in coalition governments, the leader of the party with the most seats.
The executive can therefore be removed at any time by the legislature, usually after a vote of no confidence.
In practice, this means that a prime minister must make it a priority to retain the confidence of his or her party colleagues and to refine carefully his or her performance in office, since the date when the government will be judged by the electorate at the polls is less certain. The prime minister, therefore, is under constant threat of having her position undermined, with particular consequences for the way in which she exercises authority. The prime minister has to exercise strong leadership over the parliamentary party, to ensure discipline and loyalty. One way to maintain discipline is through the party whips, who secure the attendance of members for votes; another is by performing well during prime minister's question time (or question period in Canada).
Majoritarian.
A second characteristic of parliamentary systems, notably those based on the Westminster model, is that they usually have majoritarian arrangements (Lijphart, 1994) , although a significant number of European democracies maintain coalition forms of government (Laver and Schofield, 1990) . Majoritarian arrangements lead most directly to providing the prime minister with an appropriate public forum from which to gain prominence, while the high turnover in coalition-based systems inevitably reduces the power of the leader and their public profile. The extreme case of the latter is Italy, where the institutional structures are explicitly designed to reduce the power of the leader through high rates of government turnover. Moreover, in coalition governments, the leader may have difficulty in securing the loyalty of a diverse range of parties, as has been the case in Israel (Hazan, 1997) .
Responsible government. The notion of responsible government lies at the heart of the Westminster model of government. Collectively, responsible government means that ministers must take responsibility for the performance of the government; individually, ministers must answer for the conduct of the departments they represent in parliament. While responsible government also operates in the presidential model, this takes place through individual responsibility, so that one person forms the executive for a fixed period of time;
even members of the president's own party may vote against whatever measures he or she proposes, without undermining the day-to-day operation of the system or risking a split within the incumbent party (Lijphart, 1994) .
The notion of responsible government has undergone considerable change in the Westminster democracies during the course of the past century. Collective cabinet responsibility has often been weakened and dissent tolerated on specific issues, such as entry into the European Union in Britain, or separatism in Canada. Individual responsibility has now been expanded in most
Westminster systems to include senior public servants as well as ministers, as public policy has become more complex and direct responsibility for policies more diffuse (Woodhouse, 1994) . years, tends to support the argument that prime ministerial power has increased, and that it is the prime minister, rather than the parliament, which determines how the doctrine is implemented (Kam, 2000) . The second factor is the role of the mass media; as Figure 1 shows, ministerial resignations have increased considerably since 1945, despite the apparent weakening of the doctrine; this 'is certainly a function of closer press scrutiny of government ministers as people, if not a closer scrutiny of their policies' (Dowding and Kang, 1998: 425) . 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 Britain Australia
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Note Only resignations which involved some form of impropriety or political conflict are included.
Sources Dowding and Kang (1998); McAllister. Mackerras and Bolderston (1997); Sutherland (1991) .
Party discipline. Studies of party cohesion generally assume that political parties in parliamentary democracies are more cohesive and programmatic than their counterparts in presidential systems (Diermeier and Feddersen, 1998) . Cohesion is frequently measured by parliamentary dissent, in the form of crossing the floor or roll-call voting. In Britain, for example, crossing the floor of the House of Commons is relatively common (Norton, 2000) . Heath, who experienced considerable dissent. Another factor ensuring compliance is the increasing party-related backgrounds of legislators, making them more dependent on the prime minister for career advancement (Riddell, 1993) .
Maximum terms for the government and the legislature. In contrast to presidential systems, parliamentary systems have maximum periods between elections, with the timing of the election usually residing at the discretion of the prime minister. In most cases, the prime minister may call an election if the government loses a vote of confidence in the legislature, or if the parliamentary term is coming to an end and the prime minister considers the time propitious to dissolve parliament. The result is that the governing party must exercise a strong degree of discipline over their members in order to ensure that they retain office (and conversely, the opposition party must do the same, in order to be seen as a credible alternative). The prime minister, therefore, has a major influence in being able to determine the date of the election, and the prerogative of dissolution is often viewed as a major threat that can be used against dissident members.
Various observers have interpreted the power to recommend a dissolution as a major means of ensuring discipline within the prime minister's own party (Huber, 1996) . Although this power is often regarded as a bluff-a divided government would have more to lose as a result of an election than the opposition-it is also the case that in Australia, Britain and Canada no postwar government has lost a no confidence motion due to dissent by its own members. The power of dissolution is therefore an important threat which can be used to quell dissent among members of the governing party, who may be seeking to change the government's legislative program. Nevertheless, dissent can only be taken so far, since at the end of the day, the dissenters are dependent on the party for re-election and for career advancement (Carey and Shugart, 1995) . Zealand and Sweden, and only one country-the US-has a two year term. At the other end of the scale, only three countries have a six year term. It might be expected that shorter terms would enhance the role of the prime minister in a parliamentary system, by making the prospect of an election ever closer, and the need for unity and discipline ever greater.
Notwithstanding partisan dealignment and increased electoral volatility, which might lead to shorter terms since the governing party would be less likely to hold a secure majority, it would appear that the parliamentary terms in Australia, Canada and Britain have actually increased over the past half century (Table 1 ). In Australia, the average parliamentary term has increased by just under two days at each successive election, in Canada by four days, and in Britain by just over six days. In the case of Australia, for example, a parliamentary term in the 1990s could be expected to be over a month longer than a term at the end of the 1940s, in the context of a three year maximum term. In Britain, the difference is even greater in relative and absolute termsjust over three months, over a five year maximum term. Note The per annum change is the change based on an ordinary least squares regression line.
Explanations for this finding must remain speculative, but the comparable trends in each of the three countries suggests some commonality. One possible explanation is the enhanced role of the prime minister, and his or her increased power to determine the date of election. Since it is obviously in the interests of the prime minister to delay an election until the last possible momentmaximizing the period in office and the opportunities to implement the government's legislative agenda, the prime minister will obviously to increase the term wherever possible. The data in Table 1 are suggestive of this having taken place over the last half century.
Descriptions of this apparent shift in the nature and function of parliamentary systems has attracted a wide variety of terms. Most frequently used is the 'presidentialization' or 'electoral presidentialization' of parliamentary systems (Mughan, 2000: 130) , but other terms, such as 'semipresidentialism', 'semi-parliamentarism', 'presidential parliamentarism' and 'prime ministerialism' have appeared (for a review, see Elgie, 1997) . Whatever the description that is applied, all share the common theme that parliamentary government-with political power being exercised through collective cabinet responsibility-has now given way to political power which is wielded by a single political figure-a president operating within a nominally parliamentary system.
Beyond largely impressionistic evidence to support the presidentialization view-the naming of governments or parties after the leaders, as noted earlier-rigorous tests of the hypothesis using electoral data are rare.
Suggestive evidence in support of the hypothesis comes from a study by Lanoue and Headrick (1994) The major study of presidentialization in Britain has been conducted by Tony Mughan (2000) . In surveying the role of prime ministers in Britain since the 1960s, he draws an important distinction between presentation and impact.
Mughan argues that there is little doubt that in their public persona, prime ministers are now more prominent than ever before, but that the case for the prime minister having more impact on the vote is less easy to evaluate. After analyzing a range of British Election Studies, Mughan concludes on this point that 'prime ministerial candidates are generally a more substantial influence on the vote than campaign issues … having the right leader can mean the difference between victory and defeat for a party in closely fought contests' (p.129).
One of the major difficulties in evaluating the presidentialization argument is to distinguish between the effects attributable to the incumbent, and those that are associated with the office. Since a relatively small number of cases are available for analysis, this is a major concern. Margaret Thatcher, for example, had a central presence in the British political system during the 1980s, easily eclipsing that of her successor, John Major, during the early 1990s. Equally, Tony Blair has had a major impact on British politics. The presidentialization hypothesis assumes that the influence of the leader will increase incrementally with the passage of time, other things being equal, since the prime minister's popularity and influence is being shaped by a wide range of exogenous factors, such as the mass media and administrative change, which give rise to institutional convergence.
By contrast, the incumbency hypothesis suggests that prime ministerial popularity and influence will vary with the characteristics of the leader in question, and may go up or down, depending on his or her popular image. In an analysis of prime ministerial approval between 1979 and 1996, Clarke, Ho and Stewart (2000) find support for the incumbency hypothesis, with the impact of prime ministerial approval declining significantly with the replacement of Thatcher by Major. However, Thatcher's popularity may have been affected by the legacy of British success in the Falklands War. There is no doubt that prior to the Argentine invasion, the Thatcher government was immensely unpopular, and following the war the government's increased popularity carried it to a decisive win in the 1983 general election. However, while Mishler et al (1989) , Norpoth (1987) and Clarke et al (1990) argue that her increased popularity occurred as a consequence of the Falklands War, Sanders et al (1987) argue that economic reforms were at the heart of the change.
Events such as the Falklands War, along with terrorist incidents, are idiosyncratic; there are few partisan advantages to be derived from them, other than the advantage conveyed by incumbency. A substantial US literature has emerged to examine the electoral consequences of international crises, suggesting that such events focus attention on the elected leader, enhancing their status and authority in the eyes of the public (Ostrom and Simon, 1985) . 
Exogenous Influences on Leadership
The potential range of external influences on executive power-those which fall outside the day-to-day operation of political institutions-is, of course, vast.
Nevertheless, it is possible to identify four major external factors which help to shape the context within which power is exercised and have the potential to alter significantly the nature of prime ministerial authority. The most obvious is the role of television and its associated effects on how electoral campaigns are conducted and major political events presented to the electorate. Long term changes within the mass public are also important, and two factors are identified here-partisan dealignment and the decline in electoral participation.
Finally, the internal dynamics of parties, and more particularly the decline in party organization, has indirect consequences for the context within which executive power is exercised.
The Role of Television. Many of the changes that have been observed in the role of the prime minister in Westminster systems have been traced back to the growth of the electronic media, and especially television, in the 1950s and 1960s. In the early years of television's development, the new media gave scant attention to politics, but as their coverage of politics-and especially political leaders-increased, so too did the way in which voters viewed their leaders. In
Britain, for example, party political broadcasting on television was introduced in the 1950s, but it was not until the 1964 general election that it came into its own, when the two major parties were allocated 75 minutes each of free television broadcasting (McAllister, 1985) . Perhaps coincidentally, this general election was the first in Britain where the term 'presidential' was used to describe the character of the campaign (Mughan, 2000: 27) .
During the period for which election data are available in the three
Westminster systems, the proportion of the population with access to television sets increased substantially, most notably in Canada, where the proportion almost doubled between the early 1970s and the late 1990s (Figure 2 ). The trend for Australia and Britain shows less steady growth; nevertheless, in Britain, almost twice as many people had access to a television set in 2001 than was the case in 1964. 1964 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 Australia Canada Britain Sources Starting in the 1960s, television rapidly became an indispensable tool for modern election campaigning (Bowler and Farrell, 1992; Norris et al, 1999) .
Indicative of this change has been the increasing importance of televized debates between the leaders during election campaigns, starting in the United
States with the debate between John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon in the 1960 presidential election campaign. Since then, the idea of a leaders' debate has spread across the established democracies. Of 45 democracies which were examined in the mid-1990s, all but four had a leaders' debate at the immediate past election (LeDuc et al, 1996: 45-48 ). This represents a substantial increase on the previous survey, which found that in the late 1970s, a leaders' debate took place in just seven of 21 parliamentary systems (Smith, 1981 Duc, 1990 Duc, , 1994 .
The proportion of voters watching the televised leaders' debates in both The media's intense focus on leaders in its political reporting has several explanations. The most obvious is the nature of the electronic media, especially television, and the way in which information is presented to media consumers. In general, the media find it easier to disseminate visual and oral information through a familiar personality rather than through a document or an institution (Glaser and Salmon, 1991 ; see also Ranney, 1983) . As individuals themselves, viewers are more likely to develop a rapport with the individuals they see in the mass media, and to empathize with them and the goals they espouse.
Viewers may place themselves in the role of the individuals they see, or in the role of the interviewers, and as a consequence gain a better understanding of the leader's views. For the mass media, too, party leaders are a convenient visual shortcut to capture and retain the viewer's attention.
Political parties also find it advantageous to highlight their political leaders and to ensure that they remain centrestage. Parties find it easier to market political choices to voters through an individual, who can promote a particular policy much more effectively when compared to the simple dissemination of a press release or the publication of a policy document. Such a policy can be promoted by the leader who can also be questioned or debated with by an interviewer, vicariously representing voters, further heightening popular interest. Particularly where the party is in government, the promotion of the leader's personality characteristics can enhance the advantages that accrue to incumbency, further benefiting the party's electoral standing among voters.
The ability of voters to hold governments accountable for their actions provides a further explanation for their emphasis on leaders. Voters prefer to hold an individual accountable for government performance (or, occasionally, for the performance of the opposition), rather than an abstract institution or a political ideal (Bean and Mughan, 1989) . This is more important in a parliamentary system, where collective cabinet responsibility and the fortunes of the government as a whole may blurr accountability in the eyes of the public.
By focusing attention on the prime minister as the individual who is accountable for the government's collective performance, the public find it easier to deliver reward or punishment, when compared to an abstract collectivity.
Partisan Dealignment. A second general change in the political context within which leaders operate, and one which has direct consequences for them, is the widespread partisan dealignment that has occurred across all of the advanced democracies in the past several decades (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000; Webb, Farrell and Holliday, 2002) . 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 Canada Britain Australia
Source: Combined Leaders' stacked dataset.
A major consequence of partisan dealignment is heightened electoral volatility. With weaker loyalties to the major political parties, and in the absence of strong bonds anchoring them to specific parties, voters are 'set politically adrift and subject to volatile election swings' (Wattenberg, 1991: 2) .
Weaker voter attachments enhance the role of the leader in both the mobilization and conversion of the vote. 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 Canada Australia Britain
Source: Combined Leaders' stacked dataset. 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 Canada Britain Source: International IDEA.
Declining Electoral
The Decline of Party Organizations. In line with many other social and technological changes in the advanced democracies, the traditional concept of the mass party has been in decline for more than half a century, most notably in the Westminster systems where they first originated (Scarrow, 2000) . The decline of parties as mass organizations and the increasing difficulty that parties encounter in mobilizing the vote has shifted voters' attentions away from local election campaigns and towards the national political stage. In parallel with this change, the major parties have often shifted their emphasis from local to national political leaders, in turn elevating to high office those who they believe will exercise the maximum geographical and social appeal to voters. As a result, leaders are selected as much for their popular appeal as for their policy skills or political acumen.
This change means that is there is now less emphasis on a party's policies than in the past, and more emphasis on the personalities of the leaders who will have to implement those policies if they win election. In turn, there is research to indicate that voters evaluate the personal images of the leaders in terms of their capacity to implement policy (Wattenberg, 1991: 13-30) . In practice, the information that a voter accumulates about a leader is an essential tool that enables the voter to reach a judgement about the capacity of the various candidates to achieve their policy goals. While most of the research which has analyzed candidate images and their underpinnings comes from the United States, there is no reason to suppose that the findings do not also apply to parliamentary systems as well.
While declining organizational capacity may enhance the role of the leader, 
Institutional Explanations
Institutions shape the operation of prime ministerial authority in various ways-through the rules of electoral competition, or parliamentary procedure, for example. As with the endogenous explanations for executive power, the range of potential candidates for inclusion in this list is vast. The two main factors focused on here are those which recur most frequently in the literature, and which are closest to the types of executive power exercised by the prime minister-the increasing complexity of decision-making, and the role of the public service in that process.
The Complexity of Decisionmaking. Public administration studies have identified some of the factors internal to government which may enhance the role and authority of the prime minister. In a comparative study of the Western democracies, King (1995) identified the major factors as the ability to control the careers of other ministers, which is greater in a single governing party with a parliamentary majority than in a coalition, and the public visibility of the leader. On the latter, King argued that if the prime minister's visibility was high, then he or she would have a greater propensity to influence policy: 'if the prime minister is going to be held responsible for what happens, he is likely to want to be responsible' (p.158).
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In a study focused on Britain, Rhodes (1995) distinguishes between six types of prime ministerial influence within the cabinet, ranging from the lowest, where power is characterized by bureaucratic co-ordination, to the highest, which he terms monocratic government. The highest level, which equates most closely with presidentialization, is distinguished by 'a general ability to decide policy across all issue areas in which he or she takes an interest; by deciding key issues which subsequently determine most remaining areas of government policy; or by defining a governing ethos or "atmosphere" which generates predictable and hard solutions to most policy problems' (p.15).
While it is obvious that the increasing complexity in the range and type of decisions that government must take enhances the power of the prime minister, the institutional context for decision-making also varies as a consequence of leadership style (Elgie, 1997) . A distinction is often made between leadership that relies on the charismatic appeal of the prime minister over collegial discussion, as opposed to collective decision-making which emphasizes consensus decisions (Kavanagh, 1990) . Evaluating how leadership styles influence the role of the prime minister over an extended period, net of other factors, is of course difficult. However, if there is a general awareness that decision-making is becoming more complex, then we might expect that parliamentary parties (which normally select prime ministers) will want to choose leaders who rely more on charisma than on collegial consensus.
The Role of the Public Service. In all three countries under examination, prime ministerial authority has been enhanced by a compliant and (at least in the case of Australia) a more politicized public service. The Westminster tradition of a career public service in which advice to ministers is 'fearlessly and impartially given' has been replaced by a senior cadre of political appointees. This process has gone furthest in Australia, where it is often argued that the policy agenda of the Liberal-National conservative government elected in 1996 has been assisted by a compliant public service. One view of this compliance, put forward by Pusey (1991) , is that a small group of senior bureaucrats with economic rationalist views were prepared to implement the government's agenda against the wishes of the mainstream public service, who possessed more traditional economic views. A contrary view was that generational change within the political and bureaucratic elite resulted in the creation of a shared set of policy goals, which enabled the public service to promote the government's agenda (Dunn 1997) .
While there are debates about the level of politicization of the public service, it is clear that the way in which the public service operates, the types of decisions its members must reach, and the advice that they provide to ministers, have changed profoundly over the past two decades. Bureaucrats now have an important strategic role in decision-making, and one which increasingly blurs the distinction between party-appointed ministerial advisors and career public servants. In addition, the proliferation of think tanks, often with strong partisan attachments, provides a further source of strategic policy advice (Stone, 1996) . The ability of the prime minister to derive strategic advice from these sources should, in principle, result in a greater concentration of executive authority.
Rating the Leaders
To what extent has there been a change in voters' ratings of prime ministers in the three countries, during the period for which survey data is available? If the presidential hypothesis were to be confirmed, we would expect a gradual increase in leader ratings, as leaders gain greater prominence and find Overall, there is no discernible trend over the extended period of the surveys. Keating, was one of the most unpopular postwar prime ministers, but he was followed by John Howard, who maintained-and even increased-relatively high popularity ratings (McAllister, 2003) . The Australian trend is too short to provide any indication of general trends in the ratings of the prime ministers. 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 Source Combined Leaders' stacked dataset.
Conclusion
The role of the prime minister in Westminster systems has changed significantly over the past half century. In the immediate postwar years the prime minister's fate was inextricably bound up with that of his or her party; enduring voting patterns, the strength of the party system, and stable institutions of government all combined to ensure that the prime minister was the 'first among equals' and nothing more. The first questioning of this traditional model of prime ministerial authority came with the widespread use of television in the 1960s and 1970s to cover elections and politics in general.
Declining election participation and partisan dealignment have further suggested that a transition may be underway. Institutional changes to the public service and the increasing complexity of modern decision-making have further served to concentrate power in the executive.
More than half a century on, the debate is not whether the prime minister remains the 'first among equals', but whether he or she is now a president, with all of the executive power associated with that position. The evidence presented here, rudimentary though it is in terms of the variables used, period of coverage and limited number of countries, suggests a complex pattern. The exogenous influences on the role of the prime minister, particularly the growth of television and the effective replacement of the party label by the leader's name in the public's mind, all suggest that there is a much enhanced role for the leader. By contrast, the empirical evidence relating to the operation of responsible government and patterns of ministerial resignations, and voters' ratings of the leaders themselves, suggest a highly variable pattern.
This ambiguous conclusion indicates the difficulties in distinguishing between systemic changes in the Westminster systems and idiosyncratic changes due to the characteristics of a particular leader. This is particularly acute when only three countries are being analyzed, and there are a limited range of elections. Perhaps the answer is that systemic changes to the operation of parliamentary democracies based on the Westminster model do promote a centralization of power in the prime minister, but that the change is gradual and in some cases outweighed by the personalities involved. For example, Margaret Thatcher was a strong prime minister with some presidential characteristics, while her successor, John Major, was more traditional in his approach to the role. The personality of the leader is perhaps as important-or more important-than the duties and responsibilities of the position. In short, the personality of the leader is greater than the strength of the trend.
Footnotes

1
This change in the role of the Australian Senate came about in 1949, when the electoral system was changed from the alternative vote to proportional representation. Since the early 1970s, the increasing propensity of governments to call double dissolution elections, in which the whole Senate in up for re-election, and the electoral threshold is correspondingly lower, has aided the election of minor parties and independents (Farrell, McAllister and Mackerras, 1995) .
2
The main exception was the Labour government between October 1974
and 1979, when its majority disappeared. In this case, strategic alliances were forged both with the Liberals and the Ulster Unionists, although the eventual outcome was the calling of a general election in 1979.
6
In defence of not having a formal debate, it is usually argued that scrutiny of party policies and the competence of the leaders is best left to professional media interviewers. The substantial jump in nonpartisans in 1988 is therefore a methodological artifact (Blais et al, 2001 ).
8
A third possible factor, though difficult to measure and highly variable across countries, is the role of the electoral system. Electoral systems which permit voters to discriminate between candidates have more potential for leaders to influence the vote than, for example, party list systems.
9
Two other factors, which King does not weigh as highly, are the legacy of history and whether the government is based in a single party or on multiple parties.
